-Kemal Attaturk
(inscribed at the Attaturk memorial in Canberra, Australia

Perhaps shooting the boards of companies like Nestlé, Sara Lee and Starbuck's would be a good start to changing this kind of exploitation?

Obviously, I think that economic justice for these farmers would be a better solution than wholesale executions, but I must admit I have very little sympathy for these motherfuckers unless they change their behavior.

G.K. Chesterton

When conservatives tell us that we need constant surveillance to make us secure, what they're telling us is that they themselves are prone to criminal behavior if they think nobody else is watching. The fear of exposure is the only force keeping them on the right side of the law -- and that's why it's the only form of "security" they understand. Bear this in mind if you decide to do business with them.

When they tell us that our future depends on supporting a military that's bigger than the rest of the world's fighting forces combined, what they're telling us is that they can't handle chaos, complexity, change, or being out of control. The whole world is a threat; the only solution is a bigger gun. Bear this in mind if you find yourself in conflict with them.

When they tell us diplomacy isn't an option, they're telling us that it's not an option they understand. Words, agreements, treaties, and contracts mean nothing to them. Brute force is the only option they comprehend...or are likely to respond to themselves. Bear this in mind before you negotiate with them.

When they tell us that homosexuality is a threat to American families, what they're telling us is that homosexuality is a threat to their families. As in: if they ever dared to admit their own sexual interest in other men, their wives would leave them, and take the kids. Bear this in mind when they hold themselves up as moral paragons.

When they tell us the Islamofascists are a threat to our way of life, they are quite correctly pointing out that there are fascists threatening our way of life. They're just deflecting their own intentions on to brown people far away. Bear this in mind before assuming they share your belief in constitutional democracy.

When they accuse reality-based folks of promoting "junk science," they're telling us they basically think all science is junk. Bear this in mind before attempting to present them with convincing evidence of anything.

When they tell us to support the troops, what they're really saying is: You better, because we won't. Bear this in mind when you evaluate the real costs of the war.

When they tell us the government can't be trusted, they're telling us they can't be trusted to govern. Bear this in mind every time you step into a voting booth.

So the CIA did indeed torture Abu Zubaida, the first al-Qaida terrorist suspect to be waterboarded. So says John Kiriakou, the first former CIA employee directly involved in the questioning of “high-value” al-Qaida detainees to speak publicly. He minced no words last week in calling the CIA’s “enhanced interrogation techniques” what they are. But did they work? Torture’s defenders, including the wannabe tough guys who write Fox’s “24,” insist that the rough stuff gets results. “It was like flipping a switch,” said Kiriakou about Abu Zubaida’s response to being waterboarded. But the al-Qaida operative’s confessions — descriptions of fantastic plots from a man whom journalist Ron Suskind has reported was mentally ill — probably didn’t give the CIA any actionable intelligence. Of course, we may never know the whole truth, since the CIA destroyed the videotapes of Abu Zubaida’s interrogation. But here are some other myths that are bound to come up as the debate over torture rages on.

1. Torture worked for the Gestapo.
Actually, no. Even Hitler’s notorious secret police got most of its information from public tips, informers and interagency cooperation. That was still more than enough to let the Gestapo decimate anti-Nazi resistance in Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Denmark, Norway, France, Russia and the concentration camps. Yes, the Gestapo did torture people for intelligence, especially in its later years. But this reflected not torture’s efficacy but the loss of many seasoned professionals to World War II, increasingly desperate competition for intelligence among Gestapo units and an influx of less disciplined younger members. (Why do serious, tedious police work when you have a uniform and a whip?) It’s surprising how unsuccessful the Gestapo’s brutal efforts were. They failed to break senior leaders of the French, Danish, Polish and German resistance. I’ve spent more than a decade collecting all the cases of Gestapo torture “successes” in multiple languages; the number is small and the results pathetic, especially compared with the devastating effects of public cooperation and informers.

2. Everyone talks sooner or later under torture.
Actually, it’s surprisingly hard to get anything under torture, true or false. For example, between 1500 and 1750, French prosecutors tried to torture confessions out of 785 individuals. Torture was legal back then, and the records document such practices as the bone-crushing use of splints, pumping stomachs with water until they swelled and pouring boiling oil on the feet. But the number of prisoners who said anything was low, from 3 percent in Paris to 14 percent in Toulouse (an exceptional high). Most of the time, the torturers were unable to get any statement whatsoever. And such examples could be multiplied. The Japanese fascists, no strangers to torture, said it best in their field manual, which was found in Burma during World War II: They described torture as the clumsiest possible method for gathering intelligence. Like most sensible torturers, they preferred using torture for intimidation, not information.

3. People will say anything under torture.
Well, no, although this is a favorite chestnut of torture’s foes. Think about it: Sure, someone would lie under torture, but wouldn’t they also lie if they were being interrogated without coercion? In fact, the problem of torture does not stem from the prisoner who has information; it stems from the prisoner who doesn’t. Such a person is also likely to lie, to say anything, often convincingly. The torture of the informed may generate no more lies than normal interrogation, but the torture of the ignorant and innocent overwhelms investigators with misleading information. In these cases, nothing is indeed preferable to anything. Anything needs to be verified, and the CIA’s own 1963 interrogation manual explains that “a time-consuming delay results” — hardly useful when every moment matters. Intelligence gathering is especially vulnerable to this problem. When police officers torture, they know what the crime is, and all they want is the confession. When intelligence officers torture, they must gather information about what they don’t know.

4. Most people can tell when someone is lying under torture.
Actually, no — and we know quite a bit about this. For about 40 years, psychologists have been testing police officers as well as normal people to see if they can spot lies, and the results aren’t encouraging. Ordinary folk have an accuracy rate of about 57 percent, which is pretty poor considering that 50 percent is the flip of a coin. Likewise, the cops’ accuracy rates fall between 45 percent and 65 percent — that is, sometimes less accurate than a coin toss.
Why does this matter? Because even if a torturer breaks a person, the torturer has to recognize it, and most of the time they can’t. Torturers assume too much and reject what doesn’t fit their assumptions. For instance, Sheila Cassidy, a British physician, cracked under electric-shock torture by the Chilean secret service in the 1970s and identified priests who had helped the country’s socialist opposition. But her devout interrogators couldn’t believe that priests would ever help the socialists, so they tortured her for another week until they finally became convinced. By that time, she was so damaged that she couldn’t remember the location of the safe house. In fact, most torturers are nowhere near as well trained for interrogation as police are. Torturers are usually chosen because they’ve endured hardship and pain, fought with courage, kept secrets, held the right beliefs and earned a reputation as trustworthy and loyal. They often rely on folklore about what lying behavior looks like — shifty eyes, sweaty palms and so on. And, not surprisingly, they make a lot of mistakes.

5. You can train people to resist torture.
Supposedly, this is why we can’t know what the CIA’s “enhanced interrogation techniques” are: If Washington admits that it waterboards suspected terrorists, al-Qaida will set up “waterboarding-resistance camps” across the world. Be that as it may, the truth is that no training will help the bad guys. Simply put, nothing predicts the outcome of one’s resistance to pain better than one’s own personality. Against some personalities, nothing works; against others, practically anything does. Studies of hundreds of detainees who broke under Soviet and Chinese torture, including Army-funded studies of U.S. prisoners of war, conclude that during, before and after torture, each prisoner displayed strengths and weaknesses dependent on his or her own character. The CIA’s own “Human Resources Exploitation Manual” from 1983 and its so-called Kubark manual from 1963 agree. In all matters relating to pain, says Kubark, the “individual remains the determinant.” The thing that’s most clear from torture-victim studies is that you can’t train for the ordeal. There is no secret knowledge out there about how to resist torture. Yes, there are manuals, such as the IRA’s “Green Book,” the anti-Soviet “Manual for Psychiatry for Dissidents” and “Torture and the Interrogation Experience,” an Iranian guerrilla manual from the 1970s. But none of these volumes contains specific techniques of resistance, just general encouragement to hang tough. Even al-Qaida’s vaunted terrorist-training manual offers no tips about how to resist torture, and al-Qaida was no stranger to the brutal methods of the Saudi police. And yet these myths persist. “The larger problem here, I think,” one active CIA officer observed in 2005, “is that this kind of stuff just makes people feel better, even if it doesn’t work.”

DARIUS REJALI
Saturday, Dec. 15, 2007
Darius Rejali is a professor of political science at Reed College. He is the author of the recently published
“Torture and Democracy.”

"The American intelligence reports’ recent assertion that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003 does not change anything about the current situation as long as it does not fundamentally change the minds of American policymakers. Judging from President Bush's dismissive response, this doesn't seem to be the case. The truth is, Americans do not need a pretext to continue their bullying of Iran, which is precisely why Iranians want to and in fact should build nuclear capacity.

The National Intelligence Estimate report is only one interesting development that seemingly reveals cracks on the American front in the bound-to-be-long history of conflict over Iran's right to nuclear armament. I am curious about how such a vague report that doesn't rule out any possibility was co-signed by all American intelligence groups and submitted to the White house in the midst of American efforts to isolate Iran internationally. It is not hard to imagine that once the report was submitted, the White House did not have much choice but to release it given the leak scandals it has faced before. Looking at this from the Middle East perspective, such a break during a time of struggle seems way too un-American. That leads me to think that there is something larger at work here.

I don't buy the arguments that the current American administration has learned from the failures of pre-war Iraq intelligence and that the new report reflects a change of methods for the intelligence community. In my view, the move towards relaxing intelligence assumptions is not the way Americans chose to go after 9/11 and despite the unpopularity of the Iraq war, American public opinion has not changed on tightening security. I find it hard to believe that the Bush administration's post-9/11 choice of intelligence heads chose this approach naively. All this makes me think that more than a true break in alliance, this is merely a change in tactics for the Americans. Perhaps America's post-Iraq awareness of the unpopularity of pre-emptive strikes has led them to alter their methods and combine different strategies in dealing with Iran.

With the uncertainty of elections looming over American policy, this report will act as the foundation of the narrative for the switch in tactics in case a Democratic president takes office. Probably, the report intends to send a message across to others involved in the conflict that America is sincere in trying soft-power; sort of a cease-fire offer. Experience tells us that declaring a cease-fire during a time of internal change is a clever yet common move. I certainly don't think America's eagerness to stop Iran should be ruled out in the shadow of this report.

Because recent headlines in the American press about Iran usually revolve around her nuclear ambitions, the American public tends to forget the background of the conflict with Iran. It started roughly in 1953 when a coup d'état backed by America and Britain removed the elected Prime Minister Mosaddeq in favor of America-friendly Shah of Iran. Back then, the American-British coalition did not have any reasons for ousting him, other than their stakes in Iran’s nationalized oil companies and the fact that they disagreed with Mosaddeq's ideology. Today, much remains the same except the western alliance cannot rally another coup to overthrow the current regime. It is not just that they are no more capable of it, but they have seen how badly it backfired as well. But this does not mean that they will not resort to their second favorite tool of coercion: force. In the current case, there are strong indications that the use of force is still the first option even when soft-power is also combined into the general strategy. I think Anton Chekhov's maxim that, "if a gun is hanging on the wall in the first act, it will always go off by the play's end" explains this situation pretty well. With public talk and planning of strikes on Iranian targets and with Israel's actual bombing of Syrian buildings suspected of being nuclear-research related, the gun is hung high and visible on the wall. I do not doubt it will go off.

On the other hand, it is worth remembering that it was not the Iranians who hung this gun on the wall and who opened the curtain for this play. After meddling with Iran’s democratic system, America tried to support secessionism there and also supported Iraq's assault on Iran. It cost millions of Iranian lives and an incredible amount of wealth. Today, United States still helps military groups destabilize Iran and slyly accuses Iran of meddling in Iraq and seeking regional domination – whereas her own aspiration for global domination is no secret to anybody.

Therefore I believe the Iranians should find much wider support from international community to protect themselves from this unending American aggression and the only way to do that is to have a nuclear deterrent. The greatest danger in the Middle East is American meddling. Bush's earlier remarks about assuming the Middle East was a chaotic place before American intervention were a grave distortion of truth. Without America and with its own commodity wealth, the Middle East can still be a prosperous and peaceful region."

Mustafa Domanic is a financial analyst at the London office of a global hedge fund. He is also an online activist and blogger. He contributes to several blogs on Turkish current affairs as well as global political issues including foreignsight.blogspot.com.

Clarence Darrow

Although Hollywood is routinely condemned by conservatives as a hotbed of liberal elitists, in fact it perpetuates the American myth that violence is the way to overcome evil.

We grew up on cowboys and Indians, war movies and espionage thrillers that showcased the good guys beating up and killing the bad guys. And if the heroine is in danger, then the end justifies the means, any means. We all booed when the criminal tortured by Dirty Harry was released back into society by the court. We cheered when Harry blew him away. Don’t get mad, just get even.

The American faith in the efficacious use of violence led us astray first in Vietnam and now in Iraq. And when you are fighting an evil such as Communism or terrorism, the argument goes, any means is legitimate.

There are numerous reasons why torture is wrong.

• Torture is a violation of U.S. and international law.

• If we torture, we cannot object to the torturing of our solders and agents. This is why the U.S. military opposes torture. Senator John McCain, a victim of Vietnamese torture, speaks eloquently to this point.

• Although movies and novels can create artificial scenarios where information is needed in minutes in order to avoid catastrophes, in fact these situations rarely if ever arise in real life. It would require 1) an immediately impending catastrophe, 2) a captive, 3) who actually has information, 4) that could be used to stop the catastrophe, 5) who will give accurate and timely information under torture, and 6) we are capable to putting into action a response in time to avert the disaster. The stars are rarely so aligned except on TV programs like "24."

• The experts who have studied the question find that torture does not work. Information given under torture may in fact be false. People who know nothing will admit to anything and give false information to stop the pain. People who know something can lie. Other interrogation techniques provide better information both quantitatively and qualitatively.

• The work of torture attracts sadists who are more interested in torturing than in getting information. These people cannot be controlled, and we cannot trust their judgments about what is appropriate. And a decent person who engages in torture soon becomes degraded by the experience. Is this a line of work you would recommend to your son or daughter? As John Paul II said, “the dignity of man is as much debased in his torturer as in the torturer’s victim.”

• The history of Christian and Islamic martyrs shows that people can resist and that they become heroes to their communities when they are killed.

• Torture was wrong when done by the Romans, by the Inquisition, by Queen Elizabeth, by Hitler, by Stalin and by Mao. This is not the company we wish to keep.

The Vatican and catholic bishops have argued strongly against the use of torture.

The Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church states that “the regulations against the use of torture, even in the case of serious crimes, must be strictly observed…. International juridical instruments concerning human rights correctly indicate a prohibition against torture as a principle which cannot be contravened under any circumstances.” It quotes John Paul II as saying, “Christ’s disciple refuses every recourse to such methods, which nothing could justify….”

Christians must work for the abolition of the death penalty and all forms of torture, said Cardinal Renato Martino, president of the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace according to Catholic News Service. "Christians are called to cooperate for the defense of human rights and for the abolition of the death penalty, torture, inhuman or degrading treatment" both in wartime and in times of peace, the cardinal said. "These practices are grave crimes against the human person created in the image of God and a scandal for the human family in the 21st century," he said.

“Genocide, torture, and the intentional targeting of noncombatants in war or terrorist attacks are always wrong,” according to the draft of “Forming Consciences for Faithful Citizenship: A Call to Political Responsibility from the Catholic Bishops of the United States,” which will be considered by the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops at the annual meeting, November 12-15.

Archbishop Edwin F. O'Brien of Baltimore, who headed the U.S. Archdiocese for the Military Services for 10 years, argues that military chaplains are expected to intervene to stop torture. “Where there is an acceptance of direct killing of noncombatant civilians, for instance, there is no chaplaincy worth its name. Where torture is justified in eliciting prisoner information, chaplaincy is ineffective or nonexistent.”

It would be ironic and perverse for Christians, who worship a man who was tortured and killed, to use torture themselves.

By 12 former Army captains
Tuesday, October 16, 2007; 12:00 AM

Today marks five years since the authorization of military force in Iraq, setting Operation Iraqi Freedom in motion. Five years on, the Iraq war is as undermanned and under-resourced as it was from the start. And, five years on, Iraq is in shambles.

As Army captains who served in Baghdad and beyond, we've seen the corruption and the sectarian division. We understand what it's like to be stretched too thin. And we know when it's time to get out.

What does Iraq look like on the ground? It's certainly far from being a modern, self-sustaining country. Many roads, bridges, schools and hospitals are in deplorable condition. Fewer people have access to drinking water or sewage systems than before the war. And Baghdad is averaging less than eight hours of electricity a day.

Iraq's institutional infrastructure, too, is sorely wanting. Even if the Iraqis wanted to work together and accept the national identity foisted upon them in 1920s, the ministries do not have enough trained administrators or technicians to coordinate themselves. At the local level, most communities are still controlled by the same autocratic sheiks that ruled under Saddam. There is no reliable postal system. No effective banking system. No registration system to monitor the population and its needs.

The inability to govern is exacerbated at all levels by widespread corruption. Transparency International ranks Iraq as one of the most corrupt countries in the world. And, indeed, many of us witnessed the exploitation of U.S. tax dollars by Iraqi officials and military officers. Sabotage and graft have had a particularly deleterious impact on Iraq's oil industry, which still fails to produce the revenue that Pentagon war planners hoped would pay for Iraq's reconstruction. Yet holding people accountable has proved difficult. The first commissioner of a panel charged with preventing and investigating corruption resigned last month, citing pressure from the government and threats on his life.

Against this backdrop, the U.S. military has been trying in vain to hold the country together. Even with "the surge," we simply do not have enough soldiers and marines to meet the professed goals of clearing areas from insurgent control, holding them securely and building sustainable institutions. Though temporary reinforcing operations in places like Fallujah, An Najaf, Tal Afar, and now Baghdad may brief well on PowerPoint presentations, in practice they just push insurgents to another spot on the map and often strengthen the insurgents' cause by harassing locals to a point of swayed allegiances. Millions of Iraqis correctly recognize these actions for what they are and vote with their feet -- moving within Iraq or leaving the country entirely. Still, our colonels and generals keep holding on to flawed concepts.

U.S. forces, responsible for too many objectives and too much "battle space," are vulnerable targets. The sad inevitability of a protracted draw-down is further escalation of attacks -- on U.S. troops, civilian leaders and advisory teams. They would also no doubt get caught in the crossfire of the imminent Iraqi civil war.

Iraqi security forces would not be able to salvage the situation. Even if all the Iraqi military and police were properly trained, equipped and truly committed, their 346,000 personnel would be too few. As it is, Iraqi soldiers quit at will. The police are effectively controlled by militias. And, again, corruption is debilitating. U.S. tax dollars enrich self-serving generals and support the very elements that will battle each other after we're gone.

This is Operation Iraqi Freedom and the reality we experienced. This is what we tried to communicate up the chain of command. This is either what did not get passed on to our civilian leadership or what our civilian leaders chose to ignore. While our generals pursue a strategy dependent on peace breaking out, the Iraqis prepare for their war -- and our servicemen and women, and their families, continue to suffer.

There is one way we might be able to succeed in Iraq. To continue an operation of this intensity and duration, we would have to abandon our volunteer military for compulsory service. Short of that, our best option is to leave Iraq immediately. A scaled withdrawal will not prevent a civil war, and it will spend more blood and treasure on a losing proposition.

America, it has been five years. It's time to make a choice.

This column was written by 12 former Army captains: Jason Blindauer served in Babil and Baghdad in 2003 and 2005. Elizabeth Bostwick served in Salah Ad Din and An Najaf in 2004. Jeffrey Bouldin served in Al Anbar, Baghdad and Ninevah in 2006. Jason Bugajski served in Diyala in 2004. Anton Kemps served in Babil and Baghdad in 2003 and 2005. Kristy (Luken) McCormick served in Ninevah in 2003. Luis Carlos Montalván served in Anbar, Baghdad and Nineveh in 2003 and 2005. William Murphy served in Babil and Baghdad in 2003 and 2005. Josh Rizzo served in Baghdad in 2006. William "Jamie" Ruehl served in Nineveh in 2004. Gregg Tharp served in Babil and Baghdad in 2003 and 2005. Gary Williams served in Baghdad in 2003.

Working for The Man

So as I mentioned, I saw "Sicko." But even before I saw it, I'd been thinking about why we still don't have universal health care. I know the insurance companies and the AMA are powerful lobbies, but I think there's more to it than that This is what I came up with.

Still, for the average at-will employee, the balance of power between you and your employer is tilted decidedly toward your employer.

How many times have you heard a fellow at-will employee say, "If it weren't for the benefits, I'd quit this job." By "benefits" they invariably mean their group health insurance policy, which, by contrast to people who buy medical insurance on their own, is a bargain.

Now what if those medical benefits were uncoupled from your at-will employment relationship? What if you could quit that job because you'd saved a little money, enough to keep you afloat while you looked for a new job? What if you didn't have to worry that you'd have to shell out anywhere from $400 (for an individual) to $1,200 (for a family) per month in health insurance premiums while you looked for a better gig, or one without a psycho boss, or one doing what you really wanted to do, or one in a new city or state, or one that was just different?

You'd be a lot more free now, wouldn't you? You'd certainly feel more free because you'd have one less (huge) thing to worry about.

In "Sicko" Moore mentions the benefits (to employers) of a frightened population of employees. If you're terrified of losing your job (and most people I know fear losing their jobs primarily because of "the benefits") you are a lot less likely to tell a bullying boss to knock it off, to say "I'm going home" after working late four nights in a row, to ask for a raise when you deserve it, and to stand up for yourself in the face of all sorts of small indignities that can come along with work.

There's a reason we don't have universal health coverage and I suspect it has at least something to do with the fact that the vast majority of Americans are at-will employees than it does any of the other reasons people say universal health coverage won't work here.

1Government, union, and contract employees are not at-will employees.

http://haloscan.com/tb/attaturk/8442425468292189848

By Jeff Stein, CQ National Security Editor
The same top Bush administration neoconservatives who leap-frogged Washington’s foreign policy establishment to topple Saddam Hussein nearly pulled off a similar coup in U.S.-China relations—creating the potential of a nuclear war over Taiwan, a top aide to former Secretary of State Colin Powell says.

The top U.S. diplomat in Taiwan at the time, Douglas Paal, backs up Wilkerson’s account, which is being hotly disputed by key former defense officials.

Under the deliberately fuzzy diplomatic formula hammered out between former President Richard Nixon and Chairman Mao Zedong in 1971, the United States agreed that there is only “one China” —with its capital in Beijing.

But right-wing Republicans in particular continued to embrace Taiwan as an anticommunist bastion 125 miles off the Chinese coast, long after their own party leaders and U.S. big business embraced the communist regime.

With the election of George W. Bush in 2000, some of Taiwan’s most fervent allies were swept back into power in Washington, particularly at the Pentagon, starting with Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld.

They included such key architects of the Iraq War as Paul Wolfowitz, the deputy defense secretary, Douglas Feith, the undersecretary for policy, and Steven Cambone, Rumsfeld’s new intelligence chief, Wilkerson said. President Bush’s controversial envoy to the United Nations, John Bolton, was another.

While Bush publicly continued the one-China policy of his five White House predecessors, Wilkerson said, the Pentagon “neocons” took a different tack, quietly encouraging Taiwan’s pro-independence president, Chen Shui-bian.

“The Defense Department, with Feith, Cambone, Wolfowitz [and] Rumsfeld, was dispatching a person to Taiwan every week, essentially to tell the Taiwanese that the alliance was back on,” Wilkerson said, referring to pre-1970s military and diplomatic relations, “essentially to tell Chen Shui-bian, whose entire power in Taiwan rested on the independence movement, that independence was a good thing.”

Wilkerson said Powell would then dispatch his own envoy “right behind that guy, every time they sent somebody, to disabuse the entire Taiwanese national security apparatus of what they’d been told by the Defense Department.”

“This went on,” he said of the pro-independence efforts, “until George Bush weighed in and told Rumsfeld to cease and desist [and] told him multiple times to re-establish military-to-military relations with China.”

Routine military ties had been suspended in early 2001 after China forced a U.S. reconnaissance plane down on Hainan Island off Vietnam.

Strong Denials
Feith, now teaching and working on a book at Georgetown University, responded that Wilkerson’s “remarks are not even close to being accurate. They are phrased so vaguely and sweepingly that it is impossible to deny them with precision, but they are not right.”

Rumsfeld’s former spokesman Lawrence DiRita called Wilkerson’s allegations “completely ridiculous—clear and simple . . . absurd.”

“The idea that there was some kind of DoD attempt to favor some faction in Taiwan, as described by Wilkerson ... is just crazy,” DiRita said in a brief telephone interview.

Wilkerson told a similar story in a recent critical biography of Rumsfeld by Washington-based British journalist Andrew Cockburn.

He elaborated on the episode during a May 7 panel, organized to discuss the controversy over Iraq intelligence at the University of the District of Colombia, as well as in subsequent conversations last week.

“It was a constant refrain of they said one thing, we said another thing for months on end,” Wilkerson said by e-mail. “They said, ‘Don’t worry, you are our allies and we will defend you—regardless.’ We said, ‘Do worry—if you declare independence, we may not be there; so be quiet and let sleeping dogs lie. . . .’ ”

Rewriting Bush
Another key character in the minidrama was Therese Shaheen, the outspoken chief of the U.S. office of the American Institute in Taiwan, which took on the functions of the American embassy after the formal 1979 diplomatic switch.

Shaheen, who happens to be DiRita’s wife, openly championed Chen and the independence movement, at one point even publicly reinterpreting Bush’s reiteration of the “one China” policy, saying that the administration “had never said it ‘opposed’ Taiwan independence,” according to a 2004 account in the authoritative Far Eastern Economic Review.

“Therese Shaheen . . . said don’t sweat it, the president didn’t really mean what he said,” Wilkerson said.

Coming from the wife of Rumsfeld’s spokesman, Shaheen’s remarks sent off angry alarms in Beijing.

Powell asked for her resignation.

Douglas Paal was then head of the American Institute in Taiwan, effectively making him the U.S. ambassador there. He backed up Wilkerson’s account.

“In the early years of the Bush administration,” Paal said by e-mail last week, “there was a problem with mixed signals to Taiwan from Washington. This was most notably captured in the statements and actions of Ms. Therese Shaheen, the former AIT chair, which ultimately led to her departure.”

Now retired, Paal said he, too, “received many first- and second-hand reports of messages conveyed to Taiwan by DoD civilians and perhaps a uniformed officer or two during that time that were out of sync with President Bush’s position.”

DiRita defended his wife, saying “she understood U.S. policy and executed it to the very best of her abilities and wasn’t trying to play games with” Taiwanese independence forces.

“That was always kind of a mythology of what happened over there,” he said.

Mushroom Clouds
“They are dangerous men who will lie about almost anyone or anything,” Wilkerson angrily responded by e-mail, singling out Feith, DiRita, Cheney and Rumsfeld for scorn.

He called back-stage encouragement of the Taiwanese “even more serious” than the alleged manipulation of Iraq intelligence, because it could provoke China to attack the island, triggering a U.S. response and the world’s first nuclear shooting war.

The independence issue, agrees China experts Richard Bush and Michael O’Hanlon, is Beijing’s third rail—touch it and you die.

“Even if the odds are fairly low of miscalculation leading to war, and war then bringing in the United States, this scenario is scary,” they recently wrote in The Washington Times.

A Taiwanese declaration of independence, they said, “could result in the first major war between nuclear weapons states in history, with no guarantee it would be successfully concluded prior to a major escalation.”

Jeff Stein can be reached at jstein@cq.com.

First posted June 1, 2007 5:48 p.m.

Esther Freud
Wednesday May 30, 2007
Guardian

I see them every day - the teenage girls at the gates of the sixth-form college, at bus stops, walking home in pairs. They look so confident in their low-cut jeans and grungy T-shirts, their flat shoes - Converse or Vans - chatting into their mobile phones. But are they more confident than we were? Those of us who grew up in the late 1970s and were caught between punk and stilettos, without even an answering machine, let alone a mobile, to keep track of our movements.
When I was 17, and for some years before and after, I was far from confident. In fact, I was in a permanent state of indecision and embarrassment. I was embarrassed by my lack of knowledge, experience, beauty and talent. I was embarrassed by my spots, my clothes, my dreams. I was proud, too, and that was a disastrous combination. It meant I couldn't tell anyone I was embarrassed, or ask for any help, so I drifted around with a worldly wise expression on my face, getting myself into awkward and sometimes dangerous situations and hoping, more than anything, that no one would notice, or ever know.

I had met this boy, Tom, on holiday and, unclear when he would be back in London, I had spent day after day sitting by the phone, hoping that he would call. Finally, he did. We arranged to meet up that night in a pub. I was feverish with excitement. I imagined it would be just us - we would sit holding hands in a corner, talking through every moment of the time that had elapsed before taking a night bus home to where I lived, and spending the night in each other's arms.

In fact, there were four or five other people at the pub too, all a little older than us, drinking, smoking and talking about things I didn't really understand. I hadn't seen Tom for two weeks and in that time there were jokes I had missed, people who had become his new best friends, new drinks and drugs he'd tested. I grinned and attempted to join in, sipping at my Pernod and black, wondering whether our affair stood any chance. Finally, last orders were rung. "Where to now?" We stood about, and, not daring to suggest we leave the others and head to where I lived on the other side of London, I waited to see what would happen.

There was one man, Derrick, who seemed to be in charge. He was a grown-up. Twenty-five at least, with a marriage and two children already behind him. "This way." He ushered us through dark streets, across busy roads, through closed-off squares until eventually - the others having disappeared - he invited me and Tom through the front door of a tall, dark house. We trudged upstairs and into a flat, where a girl, half asleep, appeared with smudged makeup and a T-shirt showing one plump shoulder. When she saw us, she retreated into her room. "Tamara, wait." Derrick took Tom's arm and he pushed my boyfriend into her room. He pulled me after him into another room which turned out to be his. "You can sleep in here."

I stood there frowning. A hundred options flitted through my head, but not one of them seemed viable. And surely, anyway, after a few minutes, Tom would realise the mistake and come and find me. But Tom didn't appear. I listened, but I heard nothing from the next room. Maybe he had just fallen asleep. He was drunk - we all were - but as I lay down on the very edge of Derrick's bed, I felt horribly sober, afraid of what would happen next.

I have written about a similar scenario in my new book, Love Falls, with more devastating consequences than those I suffered, and I've had two very different reactions. The first, mostly from men, is frustration, anger: "Why didn't she do something?" The second, from women: "That chapter, that was just so very familiar." These reactions have inevitably led to a discussion about the embarrassment of being a teenage girl. How hard it is to call out, to make a scene, to risk looking ridiculous, even if you are being abused.

I have one friend who was assaulted in a toilet when she was 15. She was at a party, when, to the envy of her friends, an older boy picked her out and, without a word spoken, led her into the toilet and pushed her up against the wall. She was a virgin. And someone was banging on the door, but even so he wouldn't let her go, kissing her hard on the mouth when she tried to call out. "Although I didn't call out much," she admits. "I was too shocked. And too embarrassed." Afterwards her friends looked at her with admiration, and, instead of disillusioning them, she closed herself off from them and her family. She put on weight and developed a rash of cold sores around her mouth. It was only years later that she understood it had been rape, and also, where she had caught the cold sores. At the time she just blamed herself for being, well, 15.

Another friend got into a row with an older man she'd been seeing for six weeks. She stood up to him, asked him to take back something offensive he had said. After he had, he turned to her and smashed his fists down on her ribs. She crawled out of the bed, dressed and went home, but although it was Christmas and everyone she knew and loved best was all in one room, nothing in the world would have made her tell them what had happened. She felt too ashamed, and when, even after two weeks, her ribs were still hurting, she didn't admit to it and see a doctor.

In a recent NSPCC survey of girls in their mid-teens, it turned out that 45% had had unwanted sexual experiences, and at least half of these were made to feel guilty for saying no. Fifty-six per cent of these experiences happened before the girls were 14. One in three kept quiet.

I didn't mention to anyone what happened that night with Derrick. I was too embarrassed to protest when he stripped down to his underpants and got into bed beside me. My heart was thumping. "What should I do? What was Tom doing? Did he want to spend the night with that other girl, Tamara, and, if not, then why didn't he come and find me?"

Derrick was restless. He kept brushing his leg against mine. I turned away and then his hands were on my shoulders. "Relax," he urged. "At least take off your skirt." When I did, under the covers, wrapping the sheet tight round me, he suggested I was tense and offered to give me a massage. "No, I don't want a massage," I protested and he put his finger to his lips and told me to shush. "If you let me give you a massage I'll leave you alone, I promise." So I lay there with his hands on my back, and then later I had to listen to him laugh, when he said he had had his fingers crossed all along. And that was how the night went on. Hour after hour, an awkward, clumsy battle, his hands groping me, mine forcefully, politely, pushing him away, until the light started to show in the sky and eventually he gave up and went to sleep.

I didn't want to tell anyone what had happened because they would think I was a fool. Why didn't I shout? Get up and leave? Find a phone box and call home? I didn't even say anything to Tom when we were finally reunited the next morning. Maybe he was embarrassed, too, because he didn't say anything either. And in case he had enjoyed the experience, had planned it, God knows, had wanted it, I kept quiet.

Years later, in my mid-20s, I bumped into Derrick. I was with a friend who stopped to talk to him. I hoped he wouldn't recognise me, but after a moment he turned to me. "Why so quiet, stranger?" And, to my amazement, my embarrassment finally gone, I told him: "That night, you trapped me in that room!" I felt my face grow red. Maybe he wouldn't even remember. But he did. "It was only meant as a joke," he said, and for the first time I was able to look at him. "It wasn't funny," I told him, and, as I walked away he called: "I'm sorry. I was a mess back then."

I turned and, in spite of myself, I smiled. I felt oddly lighthearted. So it wasn't my fault. Was that it? And I realised that for all those years the worst thing about that night was that I had blamed myself for being too embarrassed to protest.

· Esther Freud's Love Falls is published by Bloomsbury at £12.99. To order a copy for £11.99 with free UK p&p go to guardian.co.uk/bookshop or call 0870 836 0875.

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